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Abstract
The Article proposes new interpretationsof GATT Article XX to minimize
the harmful effects of recent WTO jurisprudence that threaten to undermine
the goals of the trading system and diminish the role of states in policymaking.
In the Shrimp/Turtle cases the WTO's Appellate Body ("AB") utilized an "evolutionary" methodology to interpret the conservation of "exhaustible natural
resources" exception in Article XX(g) to permit the unilateral regulation by
one country of how goods are produced ("PPMs") in other countries. Such an
expansive approach to interpretationpermits wealthy nations with large markets to unilaterallyimpose their preferred environmental policies, and presumably other PPM social policies, on nations at a different level of economic
development. Developing nations dependent on export markets for economic
development would be forced to chose between unwanted costs that reduce their
comparative advantage or the loss of market access.
The Article criticizes the AB's "evolutionary" methodology as a form of
"Naturalism" inconsistent with the AB's delegated authority, contrary to the
consent-based structure of governance at the WTO and the clearly articulated
views of the majority of Member nations, and incompatible with the original
understanding of the Article XX(g) exception. The Article then suggests sevt Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; Director, Nairobi
International Law Institute. J.D. Harvard Law School; B.A. University of Delaware. I
would like to thank Jeff Dunoff, Joel Trachtman, James Gathii, and Andrew Strauss for
their helpful comments and Yang Kan and Andrew Dupre for their invaluable research
assistance. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at faculty workshops at the law
schools of the University of Michigan, the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia,
and Temple University.
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eral interpretive strategies to minimize the harmful potential of unilateralism
and to restore balance to global policy negotiations.

Introduction
The recent Shrimp/Turtle decisions (Shrimp/Turtle I and Shrimp/Turtle

II) 1 of the Appellate Body ("AB") effectively reversed longstanding,
although unadopted, decisions 2 of the GATT/WTO 3 dispute resolution system that had been supported by a majority of States. 4 These remarkable
examples of judicial activism constitute a transfer of the power to make
fundamental policy decisions from WTO Member states to the Appellate
Body. Shrimp/Turtle I interpreted the Article XX(g) 5 exception for the
"conservation of exhaustible natural resources" to include living, renewable resources, 6 thereby permitting a Member state to unilaterally exclude
imports if other Member states fail to adopt that Member's preferred conservation policy, as long as its trade measure meets the general standards
1. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle I];
WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW
(Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle II].
2. See infra notes 79-80.
3. GATT refers to the informal institution that operated to oversee the interim General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT became the WTO in April 1994. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
4. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 L.L.M. 1167,
1183 (1994).
5. Article XX provides in relevant parts:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption ....
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. As a result of the Uruguay Round of
Trade Negotiations, the GATT 1947 agreement became GATT 1994 annexed to the WTO
Agreement. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M.
1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
6. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, at paras. 127-34. Previous panel and Appellate
Body decisions had found that salmon, herring, and clean air constitute exhaustible
natural resources for purposes of Article XX(g). See Canada-Measures Affecting
Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. L/
6268-355/98 at para. 4.4 (1987); WTO Appellate Body Report, United States- Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (April 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline].
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in the Article XX chapeau. 7
In doing so the Appellate Body also inherently determined that unilateral regulation, not of the qualities of the imported products themselves
but of their production processes and methods, (so-called "PPMs"), is permissible under the Article XX(g) conservation exception and, by implication, under other exceptions as well. Regulation of the qualities of
products that enter a nation's jurisdiction is clearly permitted under the
health and safety exception in Article XX(b). 8 However, the regulation of
the environmental effects of production in other territories and of the
working conditions of employees who produce goods abroad is controversial. Such regulation of PPMs increases production costs in developing
countries by diminishing their comparative advantage and thereby decreasing their economic development. It forces such countries to comply with
the policy choices of a few wealthy nations if they want access to the
world's largest markets.
In Shrimp/Turtle II the AB confirmed that unilateral regulation of production methods in other countries that meet the requirement of the chapeau is permissible, and it appeared to merely require that any
negotiations with other countries to effectuate the purposes of such regulations be nondiscriminatory. 9 In reaching these remarkable conclusions
the AB adopted an "evolutionary" interpretation methodology that interpreted negotiated terms in WTO agreements not based on their meaning at
the time of negotiation, but rather on the AB's perception of the contemporary concerns of the international community. 10 My concern with the
Shrimp/Sea Turtle cases rests not just with the AB's "evolutionary" methodology, but also with its apparently sweeping conclusion that the regulation
of PPMs is generally permissible under the GATT.
These revolutionary conclusions and the AB's interpretive methodology raise fundamental issues of global governance. Implicit in these policy
conclusions is the premise that major substantive policy issues not negotiated by Member states may be appropriately determined by judicial decision. Permitting individual nations to unilaterally regulate how goods are
produced in other countries as a condition of entry treads on the fundamental social policy decisions of other societies. Such judicial activism
7. GATT 1994, supra note 5, at art. XX. The general standards require that the
measure not be either "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries" or a
"disguised restriction on international trade." Id.
8. Article XX(b) provides in relevant part: "(b) necessary to protect human, animal,
or plant life or health .... " GATT 1994, supra note 5, at art. XX(b).
9. Shrimp/Turtle II, supra note 1, at paras. 128 and 137-38. "It is not necessary to
assume that requiring from exporting countries compliance with, or adoption of, certain
policies prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a priori incapable of
justification under Article XX." Id. at para. 137. Further, using the Inter-American Convention as an example, the AB expresses distaste for "unjustifiable discrimination" in
negotiations. Id. at para. 128.
10. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, at paras. 129-30. The AB indicated that the words
"exhaustible natural resources" in Article XX(g) "must be read by a treaty interpreter in
light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and
conservation of the environment." Id. at para. 129.
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undermines the ability of developing countries to participate in international policy formation because only the largest, most developed nations
possess the market power to impose their social policy on other nations. 1
The Shrimp/Turtle I opinion occurred after an outcry from international environmental NGOs, angry demonstrations in the streets, and the
development of an extensive literature within the environmental and trade
communities arguing that the WTO adjudicative bodies were acting contrary to accepted international environmental policy. 12 The AB's opinion
may have solved a public relations problem with the environmental community, 13 but it will create an even greater one with developing countries
and with advanced industrial societies in which access to foreign markets
is restricted.
Environmentalists' concerns about the plight of endangered species,
the emission of greenhouse gases, and the destruction of biodiversity are
well-founded. 14 However, the question of how such policy decisions are to
be made and which institutions should engage in the balancing of the
many factors and perspectives relating to these issues is a question of the
appropriate form of global governance.
There are, in general, two competing paradigms of how international
law and policy should be made. The State Consent paradigm asserts that
legitimate international norms that limit the sovereign prerogatives of
states require the express consent of the affected states, which are then

11. The economies of developing countries are often export-dependent and particularly sensitive to foreign trade policy. Exports constitute on average 49% of the GDP of
small African states and 55% of the GDP in the states of Latin America and the Carib-

bean.

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT/WORLD BANK JOINT TASK FORCE ON SMALL STATES,
SMALL STATES: MEETING CHALLENGES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 9 (2000).

12. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Environmentalism Confronts GATT Rules, 27 J.

WORLD

TRADE 37 (1993) (discussing the clash between 1992 environmental laws enacted by the
United States and GATT rules); DANIEL EsTy, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT,

(1994) (discussing the various competing and often conflicting interests
that must be brought together to achieve both continued trade liberalization and effective global environmental protection); Robert Howse, The Turtles Panel: Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 73 (1998) (arguing that since legal
instruments for environmental cooperation have not succeeded in the adequate protection of endangered species, States have been compelled to resort to unilateral measures
that often violate trade liberalization commitments).
13. Arthur Appleton makes the point. I am indebted to his article for raising several
troubling issues in the Shrimp/Turtle I decision. Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle:
Untangling the Nets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 477, 477 (1999). "From a political perspective
this decision satisfied a public relations objective-reducing the distrust of the WTO
which exists in the environmental community." Id.
AND THE FUTURE

14. There is a long history of the unthinking and wanton destruction of animal and

plant species to our detriment. The number of species is expected to decline by fifty
percent over the next one hundred years. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE
102 (2002); see also Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning:MaintainingNaturalLife Support Processes, 4 ISSUES IN ECOLOGY (1999), available at http://esa.org/science/lssues
("On a global scale, even at the lowest estimated current extinction rate about half of all
species could be extinct within 100 years.").
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accountable to their domestic polities.' 5 As embodied in the WTO system
this model requires that changes in rights or obligations be negotiated and
concluded by a formal agreement or other authorized process. 16 The sec17
ond paradigm, which I am characterizing as the Naturalist paradigm,
implicitly or explicitly draws on the much older tradition of natural law or
assumed global values as a source of international norms. It postulates
that universal norms, or norms perceived to be generally accepted by the
observer, bind states even without their express consent.18 Advocates of
this approach use nonbinding resolutions at international forums, selected
domestic court decisions from the United States and Europe, and general
language from treaties to generate binding legal norms when there is, in
fact, no agreement that these norms constitute binding legal obligations,
and explicit state consent would be difficult or impossible to obtain. 19
Advocates of the Naturalist paradigm rely on judicial activism and the
cosmopolitan conscience to inject new norms into what appear to be consensual regimes. There is a vast and growing body of work supporting
judicial activist interpretations of UN resolutions, general nonbinding declarations, and domestic judicial decisions to create legal norms. 20 Within
the WTO literature influential scholars such as Ernst-Ulrich Petersman
would explicitly adopt the Naturalist approach by treating the WTO agreements as a constitution containing certain moral imperatives, particularly
rights associated with human autonomy. 2 1 A second approach, employed
15. This paradigm is also referred to as the Political Autonomy Model. SeeJohn Yoo
& Jennifer Koester, Judicial Safeguards of Federalism and the Environment: YUCCA Mountain from a Constitutional Perspective, 75 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1317, 1325 (2004).
16. See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at arts. IX-X.
17. Naturalism may be expressed through natural law, a fundamental rights perspective, constructivist perceptions of international societal norms, or the selective use
of international instruments and nonbinding resolutions to find one's own values in the
form of customary international law ("CIL") or even general principles of law. For an
extended argument that substantive, nonstructural CIL norms are, in nearly all cases,
used as a form of Naturalist reasoning and not as an empirical source of law, see J.
Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary InternationalLaw, 40 VIR. J. INT'L. L. 449 (2000).
18. Id. at 451-52.
19. The tension between the State Consent and Naturalist models of governance frequently emerges in the international debates about the legality of the death penalty.
European governments and activist scholars argue, for example, that the death penalty
violates international law even though a majority of nations retain the death penalty. At
the recent meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, a European Union-sponsored resolution calling for a moratorium on executions passed by a margin of only 27
for, 18 against, and 7 abstaining, in a vote of the 53 nations attending. Sixty-one countries including many not on the Commission signed a statement "disassociating" themselves from the resolution because it would interfere with a State's right to choose its
own political, cultural, and legal system. See Michael J. Dennis, Current Developments:
The Fifty-Seventh Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 96 Am,.J. INT'L L. 181,
184 (2002).
20. See, e.g., ROBERT HOWSE & MAKAU MUTUA, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WoRLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2000) (suggesting

that the WTO trade regime be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the
human rights obligations of states).
21. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalismand WTO Law: From a State-Centered
Approach Towards a Human Rights Approach in InternationalEconomic Law, in THE POLITI-
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by others such as Petros Mavroidis and David Palmeter implicitly utilizes
the Naturalist paradigm by promoting the incorporation of ill-defined substantive customary international legal norms into WTO jurisprudence in a
manner that would trump previously negotiated norms. 2 2 Finally, Robert
Howse 23 and Steve Charnovitz, 24 among others, would inject their progressive social values into WTO agreements through expansive judicial interpretation of existing provisions without state consent.
The WTO Agreement and the Dispute Settlement Understanding
("DSU"), however, contain a detailed structure of governance based on
state consent and a textualist interpretation methodology. 25 The AB's infusion of what are essentially the value preferences of particular interest
groups and some scholars into the trade regime through the technique of
"evolutionary" interpretation in Shrimp/Turtle I is a dangerous trend for
global governance. The Naturalist approach to law formation is, first, less
democratic than nation-state representation under a consensual regime
and, second, a process of lawmaking that most states have not accepted.
Judicial innovations like those in Shrimp/Turtle I and II will inevitably create conflicts about the legitimacy of AB policymaking and undermine support for the trade regime in many domestic societies.
This article contests the legality of all three innovations by the AB in
the Shrimp/Turtle cases and their wisdom as a form of global governance at
this stage in the development of the international community. First, the
"evolutionary" methodology is inconsistent with the structure of governance in the WTO agreements and the interpretive methodology that the
Members selected in the DSU. Second, a proper interpretation of the Article XX(g) exception would not include living creatures as "exhaustible natural resources"; rather, the protection and conservation of humans,
animals, and plants properly falls under the XX(b) exception. Finally,
neither the Article XX(b) nor Article XX(g) exceptions, properly interpreted, permit the unilateral regulation of other countries' production
processes.
32
(Daniel M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
22. David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 398 (1998).
23. See, e.g., Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction-An
Illusory Basisfor Disciplining 'Unilateralism'in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 249 (2000)
(arguing that there is no real support for a product/process distinction and that regulatory distinctions related to actual nonprotectionist policies are consistent with the
GATT); Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers'
Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131 (1999) (arguing that the WTO should play a
role in the enforcement of fundamental labor rights).
24. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L.
689 (1998) (arguing that the Article XX(a) exception for measures "necessary to protect
public morals" be interpreted to prohibit child labor).
25. WTO Agreement, supra note 3; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2,
CAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS

[hereinafter DSU1.

OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)
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Beyond the concerns about the legality of the AB's policy initiative, I
have an overriding concern that these decisions are empowering a weak
and divisive form of lawmaking. Judicial activism is a poor process of lawmaking in a world of many different cultures, values, and interests. As a
result of the Shrimp/Turtle cases, the conservation exception was expanded
and PPM measures were permitted without the participation and input of
many of the affected nations. Nor was there agreement on this new mode
of international ordering that permits individual nations to set environmental and potentially other standards as a condition of market access. In
a world of many different values and levels of economic development,
important policy decisions on the appropriate balance of environmental
protection and economic development, including which nations should
bear the burden of international standards, are left to the vagaries of the
domestic political arena in a few powerful nations.
Part II discusses the use of the "evolutionary" interpretation methodology in the WTO context. Part II applies the methodology of the Vienna
Convention on Treaties to interpret Article XX(g) in a manner that illuminates the original understanding of this exception. Part III discusses the
implications of the "evolutionary" trend for global governance and proposes interpretations of Article XX to minimize the impact of the unilateralist approach.
I.

The "Evolutionary" Interpretation Methodology

In Shrimp/Turtle I the AB determined that U.S. measures 26 prohibiting
the import of shrimp captured in a manner causing the incidental killing of
sea turtles did relate to the "conservation of exhaustible natural resources"
and were therefore provisionally exempt. 27 In reaching this conclusion the
Appellate Body utilized what it termed an "evolutionary" approach to the
problem of the interpretation of agreements in a treaty regime. Rather than
28
use the textual approach of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
or attempt to determine what Member states intended in negotiating the
GATT agreement, the AB announced that Article XX(g) must be interpreted
"in the light of the contemporary concerns of the community of nations
about the protection and conservation of the environment. '2 9
26. The United States amended the Endangered Species Act to impose a ban on the
importation of shrimp harvested in a manner that damages sea turtles. Section
609(b)(2) provides that the import ban will not apply to harvesting states that receive an
annual certification. States are eligible for certification if (1) the country's shrimp harvesting environment does not pose a threat to the incidental taking of sea turtles; or (2)
the harvesting state requires Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) comparable in effectiveness
to those required in the United States. Pub. L. No. 101-162, tit. VI, § 609, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1537 (1989).
27. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, at para. 142.
28. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
29. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, at para. 129. The AB continued, "From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note that the generic term
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First, the particular "evolutionary" approach the AB used in this case
is directly contrary to the clearly articulated structure of governance in the
WTO agreements. The DSU, 30 in allocating responsibility to the dispute
settlement bodies, establishes a consent-based legal system allocating only
a limited law-applying role for the Appellate Body. Article 3.2 specifies that
the purpose of the dispute settlement system is "to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreements" and that rulings
"cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."'3 1 This limited mandate is reinforced by the clear language of Article 19.2 that "the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or
32
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
The AB did not determine that the conservation exception, as drafted
in 1947, applied to "living" natural resources, nor did it attempt to determine if the travaux preparatoires (preparatory drafts and documents)
resolved any ambiguity in the meaning of "exhaustible natural
resources." 33 Instead, it appeared to determine only that such an "evolutionary" interpretation would not be directly contrary to the text of the
1947 exception and thus was not foreclosed. 3 4 It chose to make this
implausible and ahistorical interpretation based on its assumption that the
phrase "exhaustible natural resources" must reflect contemporary concerns of the international community about the protection and conservation of the environment. 3 5 This assumption, however, is directly contrary
'natural resources' in Article XX(g) is not 'static' in its content or reference but is rather
'by definition, evolutionary."' Id. at para. 130.
30. DSU, supra note 25.
31. Article 3.2 provides:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the DSU cannot add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
Id. at art. 3.2.
32. Article 19.2 provides: "In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." Id. at art. 19.2.
33. The Vienna Convention permits resort to preparatory documents in order to
conform the meaning of the text or to determine the meaning when it is ambiguous or
obscure. Vienna Convention, supra note 28, at art. 32.
34. "Textually, Article XX(g) is not limited to the conservation of 'mineral' or 'nonliving' natural resources .... We do not believe that 'exhaustible' natural resources and
'renewable' natural resources are mutually exclusive." Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, at
para. 128.
35. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, at paras. 129-30.
The words of Article XX(g), "exhaustible natural resources," were actually
crafted more than 50 years ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in
light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protecFrom the perspective embodied
tion and conservation of the environment ....
in the preamble to the WTO Agreement, we note that the generic term "natural
resources" in Article XX(g) is not "static" in its content or reference but is rather
"by definition, evolutionary."

2005

The Seduction of the Appellate Body

to the explicit instruction in Article 19 not to add to or diminish Members'
rights or obligations.
Some terms in the WTO agreement, such as "necessary" in several
subsections of Article XX, are sufficiently general and undefined that some
latitude in interpretation, which one might term as "evolutionary," may be
warranted. "Exhaustible natural resources," however, as explained below,
had a definite meaning in this context. A dichotomy was drawn in Article
XX between living resources (humans, animals, and plants) protected
under Article XX(b) and inanimate, nonrenewable resources (e.g., minerals
and oil) protected under Article XX(g). 3 6 The use of an "evolutionary"
approach here undermines this distinction and effectively substitutes the
AB's ad hoc implementation of "Naturalist" values for the bargain painstakingly negotiated by Member states.
Thus the "evolutionary" methodology became the means to expand
the categories of resources covered by the phrase "exhaustible natural
resources" beyond the negotiated agreement. 3 7 This expansion of the categories covered by the exception is quite different from the acceptable interstitial application of a general phrase, such as "living natural resources,"
found in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 38 to
include newly discovered or evolved species that fall within the general category of "living natural resources." The expansion of categories eligible for
an exception diminishes rights, such as market access, for some while
increasing the right of others to ban products without a comparable concession. Article 3.5 of the DSU pointedly requires that all dispute settlement solutions shall be consistent with the agreements and shall not
39
impair Member benefits.
Consistent with a consent-based regime, the WTO Agreement reserves
the authority to alter rights or obligations to the convocation of Member
states sitting as either the Ministerial Council or the General Council. Articles IX and X grant these bodies the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations and amendments that alter the rights and obligations of Members. 40
Even this amendment procedure is only effective for those Members that
Id.
36. GATT 1994, supra note 5.
37. "Exhaustible natural resources" is not necessarily an evolutionary concept. As
discussed below it may have had a fixed and limited meaning.
38. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, at art. 56, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/122. 33 I.L.M. 1309 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
39. DSU, supra note 25, art. 3.5:
All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements, including arbitration awards,
shall be consistent with those agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the attainment
of any objective of those agreements.
Id.
40. See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at arts. IX-X. "The Ministerial Conference
and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations ....
The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourth majority of the
Members." Id. at art. IX(2).
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41
specifically accept the alteration of their rights or obligations.
Second, the "evolutionary" approach is directly contrary to the method
of interpretation selected by the parties in the agreements. The DSU specifies that the role of the AB is to clarify provisions in accordance with the
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 42 Article 3.2
specifically incorporates only the customary rules of interpretation for the
purpose of clarifying existing provisions and excludes or contracts out
those rules of international law that would diminish Members' rights and
43
obligations.
In an attempt to find precedent for its use of an "evolutionary" interpretation, the AB cited 4 4 the International Court of Justice's ("ICJ") use of a
form of "evolutionary" methodology in the Namibia case. 45 However, in
the Namibia case the ICJ actually used a quite limited approach to "evolutionary" interpretation. It determined that the phrase "the well-being and
development" of the peoples concerned was not a static concept, but rather
an evolutionary one. 4 6 The concepts of "well-being" and "development"
are inherently quite abstract, and it is therefore likely that the drafters of
the Covenant knew and intended that perceptions of what constitute "wellbeing" and "development" would change over time. Thus, the ICJ's interpretation of these abstract, evolving concepts in Namibia did not defeat the
reasonable expectations of the negotiating parties.
Conversely, the term "exhaustible natural resources" is not an
abstract, evolutionary phrase in the same sense. As I discuss below
"exhaustible natural resources" was used at the time of the GATT's drafting
to distinguish "renewable" living resources protected under Article XX(b)
from finite, inanimate, nonrenewable resources protected under Article
XX(g). By expanding the category of resources covered under XX(g) to
include those already covered under XX(b), the AB has not only undermined that distinction, but also eliminated the policing function of the
qualifying word, "necessary," in Article XX(b) with regard to measures that

41.

Id. at arts. X(1) & X(3).

42. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 3.2. The WTO Appellate Body has interpreted the
phrase "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" in Article 3.2 to
refer to the interpretive rules of the Vienna Convention on Treaties. See WTO Appellate
Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS 8,10,11/AB/R, at 9 (Oct. 4,
1996), citing U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 6 (interpreting the phrase in just
this manner).
43. "Members recognize that it [the dispute settlement system] serves to preserve the
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the exiting provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation
of public international law." DSU, supra note 25, at art. 3.2. "Customary rules of interpretation" appears to refer to the rules of interpretation codified in the Vienna Convention, supra note 28. See Joel Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40
H~Av. INT'L L.J. 333, 343 (1999).
44. Shrimp/Turtle 1, supra note 1, at para. 130 n.109.
45. Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1970 L.CJ. Rep. 31 (June 21, 1971), available at http://www.javier-leondiaz.com/humanitarianlssues/NamibiaCase.pdf.
46. Id. at 3.

2005

The Seduction of the Appellate Body

conserve human, animal, or plant life or health. 4 7 The concept of "necessary" serves as a gatekeeper to distinguish legitimate protective measures
from those that might be protectionist or are not proportional to the ends
sought.48 The drafters of the renewable/nonrenewable distinction would
not have anticipated such an expansion of Article XX(g).
However one may characterize the use of "evolutionary" interpretation
in certain contexts by the ICJ, it is not necessarily a customary rule of
interpretation. The ICJ did not attempt to discern if it had been generally
accepted as a norm of customary international law. Rather the ICJ was
exercising its inherent authority to fashion interpretive rules appropriate
for its quite different function as a world court of general, albeit voluntary
jurisdiction. Under the consent-based governance structure of the WTO,
the AB does not have the broad authority to undermine negotiated bargains. It is limited to a role of clarifying existing provisions and interpreting such provisions in a manner that does not alter Members' rights or
49
obligations.
Rather Member states, consistent with a consent approach, selected a
method of interpretation in the DSU that preserves state sovereignty by
requiring Member participation in policy determinations. This selection
inherently rejects a more teleological approach to interpretation, 50 such as
that of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the United
States Supreme Court, both of which adjudicate in the context of relatively
homogeneous domestic societies. For good or ill, the Vienna Convention
51
on Treaties ("VCT"), codifying the customary rules of interpretation,
52
The Interarticulates an essentially textualist method of interpretation.
national Law Commission, in proposing the draft articles of the Vienna
Convention, described the general rule of interpretation now codified in
Article 31 as follows: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accorof the treaty in
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
53
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
47. See GATT 1994, supra note 5, at art. XX(b), (g).
48. The concept of necessity has been interpreted to require that the Member invoking the exception demonstrate that there is no alternative measure consistent with the
GATT, or less inconsistent with it, which the Member could be reasonably expected to
employ to achieve the policy objective. WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea- Definitive
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14,
1999).
49. See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. III; DSU, supra note 25, at arts. 3 & 17.
50. Former President of the International Court of Justice, Jim~nez de Arechaga
explained that the terms "object" and "purpose" in the Vienna Convention, supra note
28, were made part of the context, but were not set apart as autonomous elements in
interpretation as advocated by the teleological school of interpretation. Eduardo
Jim~nez de Archaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES
COURS

1, 42-44 (1978).

51. See discussion supra note 42.
52. The International Law Commission's proposals were based on the view that it is
the text of a treaty that is presumed to be the authentic expression of the parties. See
I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 71 (1973).
53. Id.
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The premise of Article 31 is that the ordinary meaning of a provision
reveals the common intent of the parties. "Context" in the Convention
means a treaty's preamble and annexes as well as any agreement relating to
the treaty that was made between all the parties. 54 As noted above, Article
32 permits parties to resort to negotiating documents as a supplementary
method of confirming the meaning of the text or to determine the meaning
when it is ambiguous or obscure.5 5 The purpose here is to determine if
earlier drafts may elucidate the meaning of the text. Article 32 attempts to
enable Members to determine the meaning of the document as expressed
by the parties, not to revise negotiated bargains or permit "evolutionary"
interpretations that are substantive expansions of those bargains.
Those supportive of the AB's "evolutionary" approach have argued that
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCT, which permits reference to any relevant rules
of international law in relations between the parties, permits an "evolutionary" approach by incorporating later adopted international law. 5 6 However, under the doctrine of lex specialis,5 7 substantive customary rules that
would contravene or diminish negotiated WTO rights are subordinate to
the law created between the Members of the WTO. DSU Article 3.2 clearly
does not permit non-WTO norms, even in an interpretive context, to diminish WTO rights.

5 8

Even if one accepted the proposition that customary norms or nonWTO treaty norms may be used as interpretive material to clarify negotiated norms at the WTO, as several assert, 5 9 the Article 31(3)(c) theory
seems inapplicable. The principle of sustainable development, referred to
54. Vienna Convention, supra note 28, at art. 31(2).
55. See discussion supra note 33.
56. See, e.g., Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in InternationalLaw: Praisesfor
the ProhibitionAgainst "Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J. WORLD TRADE
87, 120-28 (1999) (referring to the drafting history of Article 31(3)(c) to support an
argument for an "evolutionary" application of the VCT): "[T]he reference to any other
relevant rule of international law in Paragraph 3 .. .[leaves] the door open for an interpretation that would take into account international law rules that take place after the
conclusion of a treaty: the so-called evolutive interpretation." Id. at 121 (internal citations omitted).
57. The concept of lex specialis is that treaty law may derogates from general law
between the parties to that agreement. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1249
(R. Jennings & A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("As between the parties, the provisions of a
treaty prevail over any inconsistent rule of customary international law, unless it constitutes a rule of ius cogens.').
58. In the European Beef Hormone case the European Community ("EC") argued that
the precautionary principle, which it termed a general customary rule of international
law, justified a ban on imported hormone-fed beef. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), AB-1997-4, WT/DS26 & 48/AB/R Uan.
16, 1998). The AB said: "[Tihe precautionary principle does not, by itself, and without
clear textual directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal
(i.e., customary international law) principles of treaty interpretation in reading the provisions of the SPS Agreement." Id. at para. 124.
59. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 Am.J. INT'L L. 535, 536 (2001) (indicating that "general international
law fills the gaps left by treaties"); David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal
System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 406 (1998) (noting that "customary rules
of interpretation.., have found their way meaningfully into WTO dispute settlement").
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by the AB as evidence of changing concerns, is not a rule of international
law, but rather a vague, albeit important, principle of public policy that
should guide national and international decisionmakers in balancing
many factors, including the foreseeable environmental risks and expected
economic and social benefits of a course of action. Its recitation in nonbinding agreements, no matter how frequent, however, does not create a
rule of law. The WTO agreements specifically and international law in
general quite rightly recognize that this balance must be struck by the
states themselves as representatives of their people, rather than by
60
unelected and unrepresentative judicial bodies.
Third, even if we assume that the AB does have the authority to engage
in this type of broad "evolutionary" interpretation, it is apparent that it is
using this methodology as a form of the "Naturalist" approach to lawmaking, not as an empirical inquiry to determine the contemporary concerns
of the international community regarding the .protection and conservation
of the environment. The AB ostensibly sought to ascertain the international community's collective will by placing great reliance on the preamble
of the 1994 WTO Agreement, which explicitly acknowledged the objective
of sustainable development. 6 1 However, there is no evidence to suggest
that by including the words "sustainable development" in the preamble
Member states were modifying the substantive terms of the GATT agreement. The preamble of the WTO Agreement, for example, does not raise
environmental concerns above others. The AB selected only one of the
many objectives in the first clause of the preamble, "sustainable development," from among a list that included primarily economic objectives such
as raising living standards and promoting growth in income, production,
and employment. 6 2 The sustainable development goal itself is further
qualified by a concern that the means be selected in a manner consistent
with the respective needs of nations at different levels of economic develop60. See, e.g., UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), The Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, Aug. 12, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration proclaims:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities with their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Id. at princ. 2.
61. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at pmbl., cl. 1. The relevant clause states:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of trade in goods and services,
while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect the environment
and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development ....
Id. (emphasis added).
62. id.
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ment. 63 This one-hundred word, internally inconsistent clause gives no
guidance on how to reconcile this general and conflicting mass of goals
and concerns, nor on how to balance them with the goals delineated in the
other clauses of the preamble, such as increasing trade and economic
development in developing countries and the reduction of barriers to
trade.64
Attention to the many conflicting goals in the preamble does not compel any particular interpretation of "exhaustible natural resources."
Rather, the AB's selective use of the preamble provided it with the unfettered discretion to choose the policy concern in the preamble that supported its policy choice. It could just as well have referred to language in
the preamble to justify a decision that the Article XX(g) exception was limited to "exhaustible" rather than renewable resources because a broader
definition would close Members' borders to developing countries' products, shrink employment and economic growth in the Thailand shrimp
industry, and interfere with, rather than preserve, the objectives of the trading system.
Abstract concerns about environmental protection and species conservation tells us little about how to resolve conflicts between economic development and environmental conservation. The international community
and the WTO are similarly concerned about world hunger, low incomes in
developing countries, and the barriers in Western societies to trade in agri65
cultural and nonagricultural commodities from developing countries.
The context of the preamble to the WTO Agreement is also instructive.
The preamble does not modify the GATT agreement, nor does it introduce
a constitution with broad, enumerated rights to be defined and expanded
over the years by the AB. Rather, the preamble introduces an agreement
that establishes a consent-based organization and a structure of governance allocating to Member states the exclusive authority to develop policy
by interpretation and by amendment of its provisions. 6 6 To interpret the
preamble as modifying the shared understanding of GATT, Article XX(g)
by selecting one of the many policy goals is to ignore the context of a consent-based system of governance that the WTO agreement itself creates.
63. Id.
64. Clause 2 of the Preamble provides: "Recognizing further that there is a need for
positive efforts designed to insure that developing countries, and especially the least
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in internationaltrade commensurate
with the needs of their economic development ... " WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at
pmbl., cl. 2. Clause 5 provides: "Determined to preserve the basic principles and to
further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system ....
" Id. at pmbl., cl.
5.
An emphasis on these goals might lead one to a quite different conclusion than that
reached by the AB.
65. Agricultural subsidies and barriers are to be a major focus of the current Doha
Development round of trade negotiations. The Ministerial Declaration stresses the
importance of policies that ensure that developing countries, particularly the least developed, secure a share of world trade. Doha Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001).
66. See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at arts. IX-X.
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Some have argued that later in time environmental treaties may qualify as subsequent agreements between the parties under VCT Article
31(3)(a) and therefore permit an "evolutionary" interpretation. 6 7 While
subsequent agreements or subsequent practice may operate as an explicit
or implicit modification of an agreement in some circumstances, 6 8 there is
no evidence to suggest that the mention of sustainable development in the
WTO Agreement constitutes a modification of Members' rights, and there
is considerable evidence that there was no such intent.

During the Uruguay negotiations that led to the WTO Agreement,
developed nations, including the United States and the nations of Europe,

as well as developing nations were concerned that environmental measures
would be used as barriers to deny their trade access to markets. 69 These

negotiations occurred in a background where prior panel decisions and
the legal literature created the expectation that PPM measures violated
GATT law. The WTO literature, including that posted on its website, had
70
In the WTO's Committee on
long asserted that PPMs violated the GATT.
Trade and Environment ("CTE") developing nations have adamantly
opposed any changes in WTO rules that would permit unilateral PPMs,
71
Clearly,
and have even objected to the formation of the Committee itself.
those developing countries that have continuously and vocally opposed
such measures did not perceive that they were agreeing to a modification of
the conservation exception. Moreover, developed nations, including the
United States, similarly concerned that such measures would injure their
trading interests, pushed to form the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment in order to prevent environmental issues from slowing progress
on the Uruguay round and to shift unilateral PPM measures to a committee
67. See, e.g., Gabrielle Marceau, supra note 56, at 117-23 (indicating that any agreement relating to a treaty that was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty form part of the treaty "context" and are relevant to interpretation thereof). Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention provides that there shall be
taken into account together with context, "(A) any subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions...
Vienna Convention, supra note 28, at art. 31(3)(a).
68. SINCLAIR, supra note 52, at 80. Subsequent practice, in certain circumstances,
may operate as tacit or implicit modification.
[Olne or more of the parties may fail to ratify the amending instrument, in
which case the eventual result may be an inter se modification; even if all the
parties do ratify the amending instrument there will inevitably be a certain
lapse of time before they do so, during which period the amending instrument,
if it has entered into force, will presumably operate as an inter se modification.
Id.
69. Gregory C. Shaffer, "If Only We Were Elephants": The Political Economy of the

WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, inTHE
NATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT HUDEC

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTER-

349, 358 (Daniel M. Kennedy

& James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
70. See the WTO . . . Why It Matters, at www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/
minole/wto matters_e.pdf
71. For a discussion of developed nations' concerns that led to the formation of the
CTE, see Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy
and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25
HARv. ENv. L. REv. 1, 32 (2001).
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where they could be controlled.7 2
In order to support its thesis that the term "natural resources" had
evolved since GATT 1947 to now include living and nonliving resources,
74
the AB cited 73 the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS").

However, an examination of UNCLOS does not suggest that there has been
a subsequent agreement among the parties or an interpretation that creates
a new definition of "natural resources" that would apply to GATT Article
XX(g). Article 56 of UNCLOS specifically added the adjectives "living and
nonliving" to clarify that the term "natural resources" included both animate and inanimate resources for purposes of that particular treaty
regime. 75 The references to resources in Articles 61 and 62 were similarly
modified by the adjective, "living," to clarify which resources were covered. 76 Such references in other treaties tell us little about the meaning of
"natural resources" in the WTO regime, which is comprised of different
parties and levies different sanctions for noncompliance. Similarly, the
meaning of "natural resources" in Article XX(g) of the GATT cannot be
divorced from the modifying and limiting adjective "exhaustible."
The faulty premise of the AB's entire analysis of XX(g) is that community concerns about environmental protection in one treaty context indicate an evolving community position in another about what measures are
exempt from GATT obligations. Even if we assume that UNCLOS introduced a new definition of "natural resources" in the context of Law of the
Sea negotiations, it tells us little about community sentiments in a context
where parties could legally impose trade sanctions to enforce unilateral
environmental measures. Nations are understandably more cautious
about creating norms in treaties when serious sanctions are part of the
treaty regime.
If one examined other more relevant international instruments and the
results of specific negotiations, it is apparent that there has been vehement
opposition rather than evolution on this issue. The more relevant instruments are the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora ("CITES") regulating the international trade in endangered species, including sea turtles. The Rio Declaration, for example,
weakened rather than strengthened the nonbinding commitment in the
Stockholm Declaration that recognized that individual nations must ultimately decide for themselves how to balance economic and environmental
factors. 77 "States have.., the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental and development policies, and the
72. Id. at 19-23.
73. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, at para. 130.
74. UNCLOS, supra note 38.
75. Id. at art. 56.
76. Id. at arts. 61-62.
77. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, availableat http://
www.unep.org/Documents/Default.Print.asp?DocumentlD=97&ArticlelD=1503 [hereinafter Stockholm 1972 Declaration]. "Man has the fundamental right to freedom,
equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a
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responsibility to. . . not cause damage to the environment of other
States ....,,78 This principle appears to reaffirm the State Consent paradigm by respecting a nation's right to determine how to balance the conflicting goals of environment and economic development rather than
harden the soft law principle of sustainable development.
Most tellingly, the AB did not discuss or analyze the single most
important guide to community sentiment about the conservation of endangered species, CITES. CITES prohibits the trade in listed endangered species and their products. 7 9 It neither regulates the taking of endangered
species within a nation's own borders nor authorizes the regulation of
PPMs in order to protect endangered species. 80 Indeed, the genius of
CITES is that it establishes an ongoing institution, the Conference of the
Parties ("COP"), to analyze data on endangered species and to entertain
proposals to update the treaty to increase their protection if other mechanisms are necessary. 8 1 This is the proper forum to raise the issue. Presumably an amendment to permit Parties to CITES to exclude the importation
of products produced in a manner that injures endangered species listed in
Appendix I would have prevailed if there was, in fact, substantial sentiment
to create such a remedy. If anything, the failure to raise the issue is an
indication that there is no broad community sentiment for such unilateral
PPMs.
It is apparent that the AB's conclusion proceeded from its highly selective choice of instruments and a narrow focus on the disembodied meaning
of "natural resources" rather than on the broad exception that it was creating. The AB's effective conclusion that there is some community consensus in support of creating exemptions for PPM measures that conserve
living creatures must be characterized as inaccurate. There is quite evidently no such consensus. Rather the majority of nations from all levels of
economic development have clearly and continuously expressed the exact
opposite position. At the GATT Council meeting discussing the
Tuna-Dolphin II report, all nations, including the European Union, Japan,
Canada, Australia, India, and Mexico opposed such unilateral PPM measures. The lone exception was the United States, which was in the posture
82
of defending its specific measure.
During the WTO negotiations, the majority of nations opposed placing trade and environment on the agenda precisely because they opposed
life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and
improve the environment for present and future generations ... Id. at princ. 1.
78. Rio Declaration, supra note 60, at princ. 2.
79. Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, March 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter
CITES]. There are 167 parties to CITES. See Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, at http://www.cites.org (last updated Feb.
15, 2005).
80. Id. at arts. II-IV.
81. Id. at art. XL.
82. GATT Panel Report, United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R at
6-10 (June 16, 1994) (not adopted) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II].
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the development of environmental standards through the WTO. Instead,
the Committee on Trade and Environment ("CTE") was formed by a Ministerial Declaration annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the
WTO primarily because developed countries realized that unilateral environmental regulations threatened the trading interests of their domestic
producers.8 3 In negotiating and accepting the preamble, WTO Members
were under the expectation affirmed by the Tuna-Dolphin decisions that
PPM measures violated GATT rules. In subsequent CTE sessions developing nations successfully opposed language in the CTE 1996 Report that
would have changed legal rules to permit environmental regulation of
PPMs.8 4 Developed nations such as the United States and countries of
Europe, while attempting to placate environmentalists, were equally concerned that PPM trade restrictions would injure their own trading interests.8 5 At the recent Doha Ministerial Conference, developing nations
86
again opposed placing trade and environment issues on the agenda.
The AB's misuse of the "evolutionary" interpretation methodology
illustrates the dangers of the "Naturalist" approach. "Evolutionary" interpretation provides the means for judges to expand exceptions and other
norms when there is no community agreement or consensus. In the
Shrimp/Turtle decisions the AB ignored the State Consent aspects of the
WTO agreements and assumed the legislative role of the Ministerial Council under the guise of "interpretation." Rather than apply negotiated rules
and elucidate terms through interstitial interpretation, the AB has adopted
a methodology that permits it to choose among the many conflicting goals
of the WTO agreement and the variety of other international agreements to
infuse new norms and new exceptions into a treaty regime designed to
reduce barriers to trade.
The reconciliation of these various values is a fundamental political
question properly reserved for Member states in the very agreement containing the preamble. By unilaterally undertaking the task of balancing
environmental and economic development concerns, the AB changed the
negotiated bargain. Importantly, it also undermined the bargaining power
83. Shaffer, If Only We Were Elephants, supra note 69, at 357-59. The formation of
the CTE also placated domestic environmental interests, but developed nations, including the United States, were just as concerned as developing nations that environmental
measures could be used as barriers to their business and trade interests. Id.
84. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge, supra note 71, at 40.
Developing countries were particularly concerned that permitting unilateral environmental regulation of PPMs would set a "precedent for ... trade restrictions based on
unfair labor standards." Id.
85. Id. at 41-61.
86. European Union ("EU") proposals to place trade and environment issues on the
negotiating agenda in the new trade round received little support from developing countries and were widely perceived as examples of "green protectionism." See Trade Officials
Assess Winners, Losers in Aftermath of Doha Ministerial Meeting, 18 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1856, 1857 (2001). Similarly, developing countries successfully opposed any
language in the ministerial declaration "linking the [new] trade agenda to labor issues."
See WTO Member Nations Agree To Launch Development Round at Tough Talhs in Doha,
18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1814, 1817 (2001).
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of the poorest states in any subsequent negotiations, including their ability
to extract technical and financial assistance, to achieve environmental
87
goals.
II.

The Vienna Convention and Interpreting Articles XX(b) & (g)

If we move beyond the "evolutionary" interpretation methodology and
examine the specific interpretations made by the AB, there is concern that
the AB has ignored the negotiated bargain struck by the parties to the
GATT 1947 agreement or at a minimum expanded the exceptions beyond
the agreement in circumstances where the scope of the exception is
unclear. In Shrimp/Turtle I, the AB determined that living creatures constituted "exhaustible natural resources" for purposes of Article XX(g)8 8 and
appeared to conclude that unilateral measures regulating PPMs (how
shrimp are caught to protect sea turtles) that are not qualities of the product itself (shrimp) may provisionally qualify for this exception.8 9 Shrimp/
Turtle II confirmed this latter conclusion first by affirming that a central
aspect of Shrimp/Turtle I was that access to a domestic market could legitimately be based on whether Member countries comply with unilaterally
prescribed policies, 90 and then by concluding that the U.S. PPM measures
under Section 609 of Public Law 101-62, as implemented by the revised
Guidelines, are justified under Article XX(g). 9 1
The AB's analysis suggests that unilateral PPMs for the conservation of
living resources, including measures dealing with global warming, clean
air, the conservation of fisheries and forestry products, and endangered
species, may be generally permissible under Article XX(g) as long as they
are made in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. The AB's language, while ambiguous on the extent to which
unilateral PPM measures are permitted under other general exceptions,
may be read to imply that unilateral PPM measures would be acceptable
87. Negotiation linkage using a two-region (North-South) numerical simulation
model of world trade and environment indicates that Less Developed Countries
("LDCs") should embrace the trade-offs in trade and environment negotiations particularly if accompanied by side payments. See Lisandro E. Abrego et al., Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations, Centre for the Study of
Globalization and Regionalisation, CSGR Working Paper No. 27/99, 4 (April 1999),
available at http://www.csgr.org.
88. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, at paras. 127-34. "We hold that... measures to
conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-living, may fall within Article XX(g)." Id. at para. 131.
89. See id. at para. 121. The relevant language states:
[C]onditioning access to a Member's domestic market on whether exporting
Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by
the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures
falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article
XX.
Id.
90. Shrimp/Turtle II, supra note 1, at para. 138
91. Id. at para. 153.
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92
under XX(b) if they meet the rather strict "necessary" requirement.
93
Older panel decisions, including Tuna/Dolphin I and 11, had suggested
that health or conservation measures associated with the qualities of a
product itself that are not overly broad may meet the requirements of "necessary," but unilateral PPMs that require that Members change their poli94
cies within their own jurisdiction do not.

The original understanding of the Articles XX(b) and (g) exceptions
appears quite different than the implausible "evolutionary" interpretation.
The Article XX(g) conservation exception, for example, applies not to all
"natural resources," but only to "exhaustible natural resources."9 5 Article
31 of the Vienna Convention directs the interpreter to determine the common intent of the parties as expressed in the ordinary meaning of the
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of their object and purpose. 96 "Exhaustible" might mean "capable of being exhausted" or it may
mean, in this context, "natural resources that are finite and thus subject to
being used up without appropriate conservation policies." While living
creatures are capable of being exhausted, they also reproduce and are
therefore renewable. In interpreting the Article XX(g) exception, the context includes the separate exception in Article XX(b) for measures to protect plants, animals, and humans. This exception appears to include
measures to conserve such living resources. "Protect" is a broad word that
97
means to shield from injury, damage or danger.
Consistent with the principle of effectiveness, the adjective "exhaustible" must have some meaning that limits those natural resources that are
eligible for the exception. 98 If all natural resources, including all living and
nonliving resources, are "exhaustible" for these purposes, then the term
"exhaustible" serves no purpose and is redundant. An "evolutionary"
interpretation to include living natural resources is unnecessary because
Article XX(b) addressed the protection of living resources.
An examination of the preparatory documents as permitted under
92. It appears to us . .. that conditioning access to a Member's domestic market
on whether exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures falling within the scope of one or another of the
exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX.
Shrimp/Turtle 1, supra note 1, at para. 121; Shrimp/Turtle II, supra note 1, at paras.
137-38.
93. GATT Panel Report, United States-Restrictionson Imports of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/
155 (Sept. 3, 1991) (not formally presented to the Council for adoption) [hereinafter
Tuna/Dolphin I]; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 82.
94. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 93, at para. 5.27; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 82, at
para. 5.38.
95. GATT 1947, supra note 5, at art. XX(g).
96. Vienna Convention, supra note 28, at art. 31.
97. See WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1446 (2d ed. 1979).
98. In U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline the AB, drawing on customary rules of interpretation, had indicated that it was "not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing
whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility." U.S.-Reformulated
Gasoline, supra note 6, at 44-45.
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Article 32 of the Vienna Convention 9 9 helps clarify whatever ambiguity
may exist in Article XX(g). The initial draft, submitted by the United States
to what eventually became the GATT, contained an exhaustible natural
resources exception in Article 32.100 Commentary on the earlier drafts
reveals that the natural resources that were under discussion to be preserved were minerals and raw materials. 10 1 Discussion at the preparatory
meetings on the precursor to Article XX(g) emphasized the problem of the
export of minerals in short supply, not import restrictions. 10 2 The policy
concern was apparently that conservation measures may be necessary to
preserve domestic supplies of exhaustible mineral resources, such as oil, to
10 3
assure an adequate domestic supply particularly in a time of war.
At the time of the drafting of Article XX(b) and (g), exhaustible natural
resources were typically contrasted with "renewable" resources. International agreements as well as technical studies distinguished "exhaustible"
mineral resources, defined as non-renewable, finite minerals or stock
resources that nevertheless might be depleted, from "renewable" resources
10 4
such as humans, animals, or plants that were capable of reproduction.
While "renewable" resources are capable of being exhausted if poorly managed, the technical definition served to highlight the different problems
and different approaches to conservation that are necessary with each type
of resource. 10 5 This definitional dichotomy between "renewable" and
"exhaustible" resources is reinforced by the separate exception in Article
XX(b) for "renewable" resources described as human, animal, or plant life
or health. 10 6 Under the AB's interpretation, GATT Article XX would contain two exceptions for renewable resources-one to protect and one to
conserve, which is a concept included within protect.
Indeed, the AB in Shrimp/Turtle I appeared to recognize that the drafting history contained considerable evidence that the purpose of Article
99. Vienna Convention, supra note 28, at art. 32.
100. U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANiZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 24 (Sept. 1946).

101. Charnovitz provides an excellent summary of the drafting history. Steve
Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. WORLD
TRADE

37, 45 (1991).

102. Id.
103. The State Department summary of the New York draft explained that the exception was designed to conserve reserves of "exhaustible natural resources." 13 STATE
DEPT. BULL. 926 (1945).
104. See Jozo TOMASEVICH, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CONSERVATION OF MARINE
RESOURCES 41 (1943).
Technically, the approach to the conservation of various natural resources varies
according to their technological nature. There are two main groups of natural
resources: exhaustible or stock resources such as minerals; and renewable or
flow resources such as soil, plants, animals, and water, not to speak of human
life, knowledge, and skill.
Id.
105. Id. at 41-48.
106. GATT 1947, supra note 5, at art. XX(b).
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10 7
XX(g) was to protect raw materials and minerals, not living resources.

The AB cited the joint Appellees' (India, Pakistan, and Thailand) submission referring to the drafting history, which indicated that the concern of
some delegates was that export restrictions should be permitted for the
preservation of natural resources such as manganese.' 0 8
The AB, rather than dispute this characterization of the drafting history with contrary evidence, decided to adopt an "evolutionary" interpretation that did not rely on the drafting history or other indications of the
drafters' intent. It did not seek to determine the ordinary meaning of
"exhaustible natural resources" in light of the preparatory documents
under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. Rather, it asserted that its "evolutionary" interpretation was not in direct conflict with the language of the
exception. Its justification that Article XX(b) and (g) may not be mutually
exclusive and that such an interpretation does not directly conflict with the
language ignores the customary rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention and empirical evidence that developing countries vehemently
opposed a unilateral PPM environmental exception. What limited evidence
there is suggests that the exception in Article XX(g) was concerned with
finite mineral resources in short supply and that Article XX(b) fully covered living resources.
Does Article XX(b) or (g) apply to PPMs? Neither the language of
these exceptions nor the drafting history provides any evidence that these
exceptions apply to unilateral production or processing standards. 10 9
Such an exception would constitute a broad, self-judging loophole that one
would expect to merit considerable discussion. The ensuing discussion,
however, concerned the export of domestic supplies, not the regulation of
how other nations produce resources. 110
While there were a few bilateral and multilateral treaties that did protect fish and birds when Article XX was drafted, there was no suggestion
that unilateral PPMs were permissible. An earlier, never adopted draft of
the ill-fated International Trade Organization ("ITO") contained an exception in a portion of the commodity section for "international fisheries or
wildlife conservation agreements with the sole objective of conserving or
developing these resources.""' While this provision did not find its way
into the GATT, one could argue that it is implicitly merged in Article
107. Shrimp/Turtle 1, supra note 1, at para. 127 (considering and ultimately rejecting
the argument of India, Pakistan, and Thailand that the term "exhaustible" refers to
"finite resources such as minerals, rather than biological or renewable resources").
108. Id.
109. Charnovitz, Environmental Exceptions, supra note 101, at 53. Charnovitz makes
the point that since there was a long history of trade measures with processing standards
with regard to fisheries and wildlife, one could argue that the GATT does not preclude
them either. Id. Notably, however, these fishery and wildlife treaties were multilateral,
not unilateral.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 102-103.
111. The Commodities Committee accepted Norway's proposal to insert a fisheries
and wildlife exception into the Commodities Chapter of the ITO draft. Havana Charter
for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
Final Act and Related Documents, at 22, 58, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (1948).
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However, even if an implicit fisheries exception for international agreements could be read into Article XX(g), it would not have created an exception for unilateral PPM measures. Rather it would only create an exception
for multilateral agreements based on the principle of consent. It would
then raise the interesting and quite separate problem of how to integrate
multilateral agreements into the GATT/WTO framework. It is not a justification, however tenuous, for an exception for unilateral PPM measures
under either (b) or (g).
If we apply this analysis to unilateral rather than multilateral "renewable" resources, there is no basis for any implication that Article XX(b) or
(g) applies to unilateral PPMs. Neither the textual language of Article
XX(b) or (g) nor the preparatory documents suggest that unilateral measures were ever contemplated, considered, discussed, or debated. Indeed it
would be completely contrary to the underlying purpose of the GATT to
include a large loophole for unilateral action that would be difficult to
police. The clear purpose of the GATT was to increase trade and hence
economic growth by reducing tariffs over time and minimizing barriers to
trade.
An interpretation that the conservation exception now should be read
to permit unilateral PPM measures is neither probable nor plausible. Such
an idiosyncratic interpretation is particularly inappropriate in an
expanded WTO. Since 1947, the nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America,
and the Caribbean have emerged from colonialism to join the WTO as a
means of fostering economic development. These nations had no voice in
the original GATT deliberations. These developing nations quite reasonably signed the WTO agreements with the assumption that PPMs violated
GATT rules and have long expressed their opposition to unilateral PPM
measures 113 as contrary to their economic interests and the underlying
social policy that wisely protects developing nations from unilateral
actions of a few powerful countries. 114 For the AB to expand the conserva112. For an argument that this quite limited exception was viewed by the Temporary
Chairman of the Working Group (on Inter-Governmental Arrangements) as covered
under the "conservation of exhaustible natural resources" language in the unadopted
Commodity Section and that therefore this interpretation should also govern the Commercial chapter, which was used as a draft for the GATT, see Charnovitz, Environmental
Exceptions, supra note 101, at 46-47. It is unlikely that the GATT negotiators were
aware of or intended such an unusual interpretation. In March of 1948 at the Havana
meeting adopting the ill-fated ITO Charter, "the Commodities Committee inserted [an]
exemption for any intergovernmental agreement relating solely to the conservation of
fisheries resources, migratory birds or wild animals." Id. at 46 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Despite the Commodities Committee recommendation, this was not
added to the Commercial Policy Chapter.
113. During the negotiations of the 1996 WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment Report, developing countries as well as several developed countries were able to
defeat any attempts to propose substantive legal changes to WTO rules to permit unilateral trade restrictions for environmental or labor protection. See Shaffer, The World
Trade Organization Under Challenge, supra note 71, at 40-41.
114. Developing countries sought both during the WTO negotiations and in the Committee on Trade and the Environment to preserve the existing legal position that unilat-
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tion exception without a discussion of the original GATT negotiations and
in the face of widespread opposition during the Uruguay Round and CTE
negotiations is to elevate its newly found policy perspective above that of
the majority of nations representing the majority of the world's people.
The AB explained:
[C]onditioning access to a Member's domestic market on whether exporting
Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed
by the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of meathe scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to () of
sures falling1 1within
5
Article XX.
This statement is unclear as to whether and when unilateral PPM measures are permissible, as opposed to those unilateral measures that regulate
the qualities of a product itself such as the bacterial levels on imported
shrimp. An earlier panel had cited the exception for prison labor as evidence that regulation of production methods in other countries, such as
the conditions of labor, are in some circumstances permitted in GATT
exceptions. 1 16 The prison labor exception, however, is a specifically mentioned clear exception for a particular method of production, not a broad
implied category. The policy purpose is to minimize the cost advantage of
goods produced in prisons at below market wages that do not reflect a
comparative advantage. It effectively operates as a subsidy to production
based on a government policy that provides an unfair advantage to that
nation. The specific mention of a disfavored practice that happens to be a
method of production that might defeat the purpose of the agreement does
not imply that unspecified PPM measures that restrict trade are generally
permitted. An interpretation more faithful to the text is that exceptions to
market access for unilateral PPMs must be specifically stated.
There is no evidence in either the discussions or the preparatory documents to suggest that unilateral PPM measures were intended to be exempt
under Article XX(b) or (g). The more recent negotiations at the Uruguay
the
round and at Doha suggest that there is widespread opposition among
1 17
majority of nations to any exception for unilateral PPM measures.
III.

Implications for Global Governance and Suggested Interpretive
Strategies

This Article has suggested that the "evolutionary" interpretation methodology as used by the AB is inconsistent with the AB's delegated authority
and the clearly delineated system of governance in the DSU and the WTO
eral PPM measures violated the GATT and also to expand market access for developing
country products against the rising pressure for what they perceived as green protectionism. See the comments of the Delegate of India to the WTO negotiations, Asoke Mukerji,
Developing Countries and the WTO: Issues of Implementation, 34 J. WoRLD TRADE 33,
51-53 (2000).
115. Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 1, at para. 121.
116. See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 82, at para. 3.35 (referring to the exception in
Article XX(e) on the products of prison labor).
117. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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Agreement. Moreover, a textualist interpretation that utilizes the preparatory documents to clarify ambiguity to preserve rights under the agreements, as required under the DSU, suggests that the Article XX(g)
exception was not intended to apply to renewable living resources covered
by XX(b). Finally, there is no textual or documentary evidence to suggest
that unilateral PPM measures were ever contemplated or discussed except
in the specific context of prison labor, which was widely viewed as an
unfair method of competition.
In several respects the AB should be praised for its candor. By using
an "evolutionary" methodology rather than hiding its normative choice in
formal textual interpretation, the AB has made it clear that it is using a
"Naturalist" technique to expand the Article XX(g) exception. As argued
above, this approach fundamentally misconceives the role of the AB under
the WTO consent-based system of governance. Yet we might also see the
use of the "evolutionary" methodology in a more positive sense as a technique for requesting guidance from Member states on the proper way to
balance competing policies.
Judicial activism is, however, an unwise means to moderate the
excesses of laissez-faire capitalism. There is a need for wise international
environmental and labor policy, but such important and politically sensitive legislative issues require a balancing of policy factors and economic
development concerns that vary from country to country. The problems of
global warming, environmental degradation, and child labor are complex,
multilayered problems that impact nations differently and are not appropriate for simple interest balancing by judges or for an idiosyncratic solution by one powerful nation.
At one level we might see such judicial activism as a failure of process.
This expansion of the Article XX(g) exception and the contraction of market access occurred without the input of all affected parties. If global public policy is to be wise and effective, there must be the full elaboration of
the different views and perspectives of affected states, a full discussion of
less trade-intrusive policy alternatives to achieve these ends, and the acceptance of these norms or policy solutions by those expected to comply.
Under the undemocratic "evolutionary" interpretation methodology of the
AB, the domestic politics of powerful nations would determine the costs to
be borne by developing countries for Western cultural preferences without
consideration of distributive justice concerns.
From another perspective the AB's "Naturalism" may be seen as an
attempt to "overjudicialize" 1 18 the WTO legal system, i.e., to incorporate
nonbinding, soft law norms from other contexts to fashion obligatory legal
rules before states are willing to assume such an obligation. Under this
analysis, the AB in Shrimp/Turtle I has constructed a compliance regime for
protecting endangered species within a nation's borders when nations
118. For a discussion of the overjudicialization of the WTO, see WilliamJ. Davey, The
Case for a WTO Permanent Panel Body, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 177, 183 (2003) (describing
the WTO as "a system that is already too legalistic").
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remain unwilling to agree to such a limitation themselves. Nations of the
WTO have been unwilling to agree on the development of environmental
standards or how to integrate environmental agreements into the WTO.
The COP at CITES provides a procedure and a forum for amendments to
protect endangered species, but there is no consensus on regulating intrastate activities and none on trade sanctions as a remedy for such a norm.
The danger of "overlegalization" or premature legalization is that it
may place at risk the belief of many nations in the mutual reciprocity of the
system and create domestic pressure to resist compliance, thereby undermining the regime." 9 The AB's "evolutionary" methodology undermines a
fundamental goal of the WTO trading regime, a system under the rule of
law rather than one controlled by economic power. Paradoxically, the
abdication of the AB's responsibility to police barriers to access reduces
the legal quality of the regime and emphasizes economic power as the
means to obtain and deny access.
Consider two troubling possibilities down the slippery slope of unilateral activity. First, assume that the European Union issues a regulation
excluding imported products, such as autos and steel, produced in a manner that does not comply with what the EU claims are the international
standards in the Kyoto Protocol. Let us assume that the measure is nondiscriminatory and "related to" conservation of an "exhaustible natural
resource"-clean air or at least appropriate levels of oxygen to forestall climate change.
Second, assume that either in retaliation or on its own, the United
States passes the Comprehensive Global Warming Act of 2004. The
United States has long protected its steel industry. President Bush recently
approved steel tariffs under §201 of the Trade Act 120 and then subsequently withdrew them. The tariffs likely violated the 1995 Safeguards
Agreement. Assume that as the election of 2004 approaches, President
Bush and Congress pass this legislation that includes tax incentives to
reduce greenhouse gases and a ban on the import of foreign steel produced
at lower air pollution standards than those in the United States. Again, the
legislation is non-discriminatory in the sense that all steel produced in a
manner consistent with U.S. domestic standards are given national treatment, and it is "related to" conservation. This particular stratagem in an
election year requires no sacrifice by U.S. industry and indeed protects a
favored industry. The measure may well have the overwhelming support of
the environmental community and the steel industry. However, it would
119. For a discussion of overlegalization, see Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing
Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth CaribbeanBacklash
Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1851-55 (2002). Overlegalization may occur when treaty obligations increase over time, requiring more extensive
changes to domestic laws than anticipated, and generating domestic opposition to compliance. Id. at 1854. See also Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade
Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT'L ORG. 603, 630 (2000)
(cautioning that the risk of increased legalization of international trade is loss of
liberalization).
120. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251.
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clearly reduce exports from Brazil and South Korea, reduce their gross
domestic product ("GDP") and employment growth, and slow their economic development.
From a legal perspective, the XX(g) exception was never intended to be
used as a broad exception for unilateral regulation determining how other
nations produce goods. Lower wage and a more flexible environmental
regime may form part of a developing nation's comparative advantage.
From a policy perspective, it is unwise to encourage a shift of basic manufacturing jobs to advanced industrialized countries, as this could potentially lower world economic growth, increase the price of cars and other
steel products, and increase pollution in the United States.
From a global governance perspective, decisions on minimum international environmental standards should not be made unilaterally by politicians running for election in one country. History and common sense
suggest that unilateral power will be used in the self-interest of the decisionmaker and may encourage competitors to impose similar or retaliatory
restrictions on international trade.
The overwhelming majority of Member states of the WTO, including
both developed and developing countries, have opposed the use of unilat12 1
It
eral trade restrictions to achieve labor and environmental objectives.
is also far from clear that the government of the United States supports
PPMs as a general means for injecting social policy into the trade regime.
The U.S. position in Shrimp/Turtle I was motivated by strategic concerns
and should not be seen as general support for the concept of PPM regulation. 122 Unilateral requirements that production be consistent with one
state's environmental or labor policies undermine the United States' long
term strategy of freer trade and provide a powerful tool for other countries
to use against the United States in trade battles, as the European Union
global warming regulation example suggests. The potential breadth of a
broadened PPM exception and its negative effect on market access and
freer trade will undermine the restraint that is necessary in a regime with
weak sanctions.
We may now have a serious "slippery slope" problem in placing limits
on the kind of unilateral PPM measures that are permissible while creating
a large loophole that will be difficult and potentially expensive to police
121. The United States and the EU, while sounding supportive of the objectives of
Western environmental NGOs, were actually ambivalent because they realized that environmental and other domestic restrictions on trade would also injure their trading interests. They were unwilling to develop strategies that would successfully induce
developing countries to agree to changes in WTO rules and instead referred issues "such
as the permissibility of unilateral [environmental] trade restrictions" to the CTE where
they knew such issues could not be resolved. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization
Under Challenge, supra note 71, at 81-82.
122. The United States, for example, threatened to challenge an EC Directive that
would have banned the import of U.S. fur products based on asserted cruel methods of
trapping animals. See generally Andre Nollkaemper, The Legality of Moral Crusades Disguised in Trade Laws: An Analysis of the EC "Ban" on Furs from Animals Taken by Leghold
Traps, 8 J. ENVrL L. 237 (1996).
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through adjudication. Does the Article XX(g) exception apply to all unilateral process conservation policies, including global warming measures,
applied in a nondiscriminatory manner? Is it also available for process
regulations in other areas such as labor policies under Article XX(a), or
health and safety policies under Article XX(b)? The transboundary character of global warming and other global commons issues requires a global
solution, not a solution imposed by one nation. Consultation and even a
requirement of nondiscriminatory good faith negotiations are inadequate.
A broadened conservation exception creates an incentive for the unilateralist country in negotiations to not compromise and to insist on its policy
approach,
even if it may be required to be flexible on the means to achieve
it. 12 3 This improves the bargaining position of the unilateralist with market power and diminishes that of the weaker nation irrespective of the merits or economic impact of their claims.
With several panels and now the AB interpreting Article XX(g) to
include living renewable resources such as fish stocks and sea mammals as
"exhaustible," the readoption of the term's original understanding seems
unlikely at this point. The more important question today, because it
potentially undermines a consensual, more democratic system of global
governance, is whether a nation may unilaterally impose its own environmental, labor, or other process or production policy standards on Members
as a condition of access to its market.
I want to suggest several interpretations of Article XX to minimize the
harmful potential of unilateralism and to reinstate balance in global policy
negotiations. Future jurisprudence should narrow the impact of Shrimp/
Turtle I and II to maximize Less Developed Countries' ("LDCs") access to
markets and win-win trade while reducing the opportunity for
protectionism.
First, the application of Article XX(g) to living creatures should be limited to an emergency exception. 1 24 "Exhaustible" in the context of living
creatures should be interpreted not as capable of being exhausted, but presently in danger of extinction. This gives the adjective "exhaustible" a purposeful meaning, where now it has none under the AB's opinion in
Shrimp/Turtle I. All living creatures are potentially exhaustible, but they
also reproduce and merit somewhat different treatment than finite
resources. The present exhaustibility of living resources should be demonstrated by objective criteria, including their having been listed as endangered species under CITES or, in an emergency for unlisted species, by
definitive scientific evidence that establishes a near-term danger of
extinction.
123. Shrimp/Turtle II appears to require that negotiations be conducted in good faith,
but not that they be concluded on terms satisfactory to both parties. Shrimp/Turtle I1,
supra note 1, at para. 123 (indicating that "an international agreement might nevertheless not be possible despite the serious, good faith efforts of the United States").
124. See John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/ProcessDistinction, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 303, 307 (2000) (hinting that an emergency limitation exists).
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Such a reading would exclude unilateral measures to limit greenhouse
gases or other agents of air pollution from the Article XX(g) exception, subject matter best left to international negotiation and multilateral solutions.
Conservation measures other than those protecting endangered species
should properly be considered under the Article XX(b) exception to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health. Trade sanctions in the multilateral
agreements themselves, such as those in the Montreal Protocols on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 12 5 might well meet the "necessary"
requirement of XX(b).
Second, the unilateral regulation of how goods or commodities are
produced in other countries (PPMs) must not be seen as generally permissible under the Article XX exceptions. Generally permitting PPMs creates
large, potentially abusive loopholes that were not discussed or debated during the ITO and GATT negotiations. A fundamental assumption of WTO
jurisprudence has been to narrowly construe exceptions to minimize the
loss of Members' rights. 1 26 The much quoted passages in Shrimp/Turtle I
and II that unilateralism may, to some degree, be a feature of the exceptions is unclear with regard to PPMs. 1 27 Unilateralism is also a feature of

the regulation of the qualities of products themselves.
An interpretation of the place of PPMs within the Article XX framework more faithful to the original understanding, as expressed during the
GATT negotiations and consistent with the position espoused by the majority of countries during the negotiation of the WTO agreements, would be
that unilateral PPMs are a feature of the exceptions only to the extent that
the particular exception specifically permits PPM measures. The prison
labor exception in Article XX(e) 12 8 is specifically and directly concerned
with the manner in which goods are produced in order to prevent the
import of artificially low-priced goods not related to comparative advantage. Only Article XX exceptions that specifically permit measures regulating how goods are produced should be read to permit PPM measures.
Following this line of reasoning, if the AB adopts the suggestion to
limit Article XX(g) to an emergency exception for endangered species, then
this emergency exception may be read to encompass measures necessary to
prevent their extinction. Increasingly, nations are cooperating to preserve
fishing stocks, migratory birds, and other wildlife. 12 9 This approach
would effectively incorporate a limited wildlife PPM exception in Article
125. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 4, Sept. 16,
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 I.L.M. 1550. Article 4 bans the import and export of listed
substances. Id.
126. Shrimp/Sea Turtle I, supra note 1, at para. 157. The AB held that each exception
"is a limited and conditional exception from the substantive obligations ...in GATT
1994." Id., adopting GATT Panel Report, United States-Section 337 of the United States
TariffAct of 1930, BISD 365/345, para. 5.9 (Nov. 7, 1989) ("Article XX(d) thus provides
a limited and conditional exception from obligations under other provisions.").
127. The relevant passage is quoted supra note 92. "This statement expresses a principle that was central to our ruling in United States-Shrimp." Shrimp/Turtle II, supra note
1, at para. 138.
128. GATT 1947, supra note 5, at art. XX(e).
129. Charnovitz, Environmental Exceptions, supra note 101, at 53.
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XX(g) that was at least considered during the ITO negotiations, but it
would not permit PPM measures in other sections where it is not an inherent part of the exception.
Article XX(b) should not be seen to generally encompass PPMs. Measures to conserve living creatures that are not endangered species should
be required to meet the criteria of "necessary" in Article XX(b). Multilateral conservation or environmental agreements that are truly international
might be seen as "necessary." The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement
("SPS") is properly seen as a greater specification of the Article XX(b)
exception with necessity and scientific evidence requirements to prevent
the abusive use of sanitary regulations. It also expresses a clear preference
for international standards. The SPS requires that such measures be "not
more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection" 130 and that they be based on scientific principles. 13 1 These requirements recognize that even facially nondiscriminatory regulations may in fact be disguised forms of protectionism
and should be policed to preserve the rights of Members under the agreements. The wave of the future at the WTO will be greater specification to
prevent protectionist abuse because the temptation to acquiesce to domes32
tic political pressure is so great.'
The third proposed interpretation of Article XX to eliminate unilateralism is to encourage the AB to continue the process of clarifying that the
chapeau of Article XX contains a proportionality test even when measures
are nondiscriminatory. The phrase, "disguised restriction on international
trade" in the chapeau, should be read to both limit the abuse of the general
exceptions and to require that measures be proportional to the policy ends
sought. To some extent the AB has begun this process by its interpretation
of the nondiscrimination provisions in the chapeau. In Shrimp/Turtle II
the AB required that the U.S. Guidelines applying the measure not exclude
shrimp caught without the use of Turtle Excluder Devices ("TEDs") if the
program is "comparable in effectiveness.' 1 33 This may be seen as a preference for performance standards that reduce protectionism by permitting a
variety of means to achieve a given conservation policy and allowing different cultural solutions to the problem of incidental taking, mindful of the
special conditions in many developing countries. The AB also interpreted
"arbitrary discrimination" to require that the certification process be struc130. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 27 (1994), art. 5.6, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/
spsagreement.pdf [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
131. Id. at art. 2.2.
132. For a discussion of how WTO rules help governments resist domestic political
pressure for protectionism, see John McGinnis & Mark Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HAi~v. L. REV. 511, 515 (2000) (stating that "Itihe WTO and the trade
agreements it administers act to restrain protectionist interest groups, thereby promoting
both free trade and democracy").
133. See Shrimp/Turtle II, supra note 1, at para. 144. Here the AB agreed with the
formulation of the Panel that a program "comparable in effectiveness" avoids the problem of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. Id.
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tured in "rigorous compliance with the fundamental requirements of due
process." 13 4 A fair process requirement similarly minimizes the opportunity for further denial of market access through the manipulation of
administrative processes or by the arbitrary application of the criteria for
eligibility to import.
Proportionality and fairness should be extended to the other major
limitation in the chapeau, "disguised restrictions on international trade."
The AB has laid the foundation for this process by stating "the purpose and
object of the introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention
of 'abuse of the exceptions."' 135 If these concerns are applied to the prevention of abuse in the design and purpose of measures as well as in their
application, this would effectively create a proportionality requirement in
the chapeau that would balance the right to an exception with the other
Members' right to market access.
The chapeau should be interpreted to ensure that the purpose and
design of conservation measures, as well as how they are applied, are narrowly targeted to achieve the conservation objective while minimizing the
restrictions on market access and the opportunity for protectionism. In
Shrimp/Turtle I, the AB explained that the chapeau embodies the recognition by Members of the need to balance the rights of a Member to invoke an
exception and the substantive rights (including access to markets) of other
Members. 136 The balancing of rights apparently includes a balancing of
several factors including the policy purpose and the design of the measure.
"The location of the line of equilibrium [between rights], as expressed in
the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and
at stake vary and as the facts making up specific
shape of the measures
13 7
cases differ."
There is some drafting history that the term "applied" should be given
a broad interpretation to prevent abusive design or purposes, not just in the
application of measures. The AB, in interpreting the chapeau in Shrimp/
Turtle I, discussed the drafting history of the phrase "disguised restriction
on trade." The United Kingdom, in order to prevent abuse, proposed text
for the chapeau that qualified the exceptions, "provided that they [exceptions] are not applied in such a manner as to constitute. . . a disguised
restriction on international trade." 138 The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg made clear that their concern in supporting a qualifying clause
139
was to prevent indirect protection.
134. Shrimp/Turtle I,supra note 1, at para. 182.
135. Id. at para. 151 (quoting U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 6, at 20. "If
those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling
within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the
legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other parties
concerned.") Id.
136. Id. at para. 156.
137. Id. at para. 159 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at para. 157 n.155 (emphasis added).
139. See id. at n.154.
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The AB went on to address only the application of the U.S. measure as
a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination. Nevertheless, in the
appropriate case the chapeau should be used to police the indirect protection in purpose and design. The chapeau mandate that measures not be
applied in a manner that would constitute a "disguised restriction on international trade" should be read to include not just the form of the measure,
but also the application of the abusive policy or the application of an abusive
policy design. The AB would then be in a position to balance a Member's
right to any exception, conservation or otherwise, in the context of a commingled protectionist purpose. It would thereby require other less restrictive means to achieve a conservation or other policy objective. Such an
approach will permit the AB to minimize protectionism in the valid use of
exceptions and to police the abusive use in order to protect local industry
under the guise of a legitimate purpose.
The meaning of "necessary" has appeared to evolve in recent WTO
jurisprudence and may provide helpful criteria to balance Members' rights
in the chapeau. 140 Earlier cases had interpreted "necessary" to require the
least GATT-inconsistent alternative reasonably available. 14 1 In the KoreaBeef case, 142 the AB formulated a more nuanced balancing test to apply in
determining whether a measure is "necessary":
In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not "indispensable,"
may nevertheless be "necessary" within the contemplation of Article XX(d),
involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors
which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of
the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and143the
accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.
This balancing test provides a useful beginning approach in assessing
whether the form of a measure, ostensibly for a conservation purpose, is
nevertheless a "disguised restriction on international trade" that is not proportional to the policy goal or is otherwise a disguised form of protectionism. All measures should be designed to effectively achieve permissible
policy goals with minimum interference with Members' rights. If unilateral
PPM measures are permitted under the conservation exception, or contrary to the advice of this Article, under the other Article XX exceptions,
then the AB must police the abuse of exceptions as surreptitious forms of
140. For an extended discussion of the necessity and proportionality tests in Article
XX, the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement ("TBT Agreement"), and the SPS, see
Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the
Sanitary and PhytosanitaryMeasures Agreement, and the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and
Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 J.
WORLD TRADE 811, 824-33, 850-54 (2002).

141. See GATT Panel Report, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
B.I.S.D. L/6439-36S/345 para. 5.26 (Nov. 7, 1989); GATT Panel Report, ThailandRestrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, B.I.S.D. DS10/R-37S/200
para. 23 (Nov. 7, 1990).
142. WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R and WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000).
143. Id. at para. 164.
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protectionism. Careful scrutiny may lead to measures that achieve a permissible purpose with a minimum of restrictions on access.
There is a long history of the misuse and exploitation of exceptions
and technical requirements to protect local markets and to subsidize
exports in a manner that has particularly injured developing countries.
The United States and Europe, while exponents of freer trade, have long
used and misused exceptions and subsidies to protect their steel, textile,
and agricultural industries. These are precisely the industries in which the
LDCs have a comparative advantage and where freer trade is likely to
increase income and employment 44to combat poverty and ultimately to
1
improve environmental standards.
Unilateral PPMs that impose the social policy of the wealthy on the
developing countries, particularly in industries vital to developing countries, must be narrowed and subjected to multilateral negotiations and discipline. The worthy goals of species conservation, cleaner environment,
and biodiversity are best achieved by developed nations subsidizing the
adoption of their preferred policies rather than imposing costs on poorer
nations. 145 In employing an "evolutionary" methodology to engraft its version of wise public policy onto Article XX, the AB exceeded its authority
and undermined the governance structure of the WTO.

144. See The World Bank, Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Building An Inclusive
World Economy (World Bank Policy Research Report #23591) 53-62 (2002).
145. JAGDIsH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 153-58 (2004) (noting that
developing countries have significant resource problems and that wealthy developed
countries seeking to impose their value preferences on poorer nations should subsidize
the PPMs that they advocate).

